In recent times, the EC-Commission has developed the opinion that, contrary to present practice, food for the purpose of aid ought to be produced systematically. From the point of view of development policy, such notions must rouse serious doubts in their soundness, which would be virtually superfluous in the case of food aid drawn from "unplanned" agricultural surpluses.
I
n one of its recent Information Papers 1 the European Commission has dealt with "Community Food Aid". This Paper states that the EC is confronted with agricultural surpluses, on the one hand, and the demand for aid by the countries of the Third World, on the other hand. According to the same document the Commission is convinced of the "need" for "making the Community's food aid independent, to a certain degree, of the fluctuations in the size of the available stocks of farm produce". Therefore, the Commission "occupies its mind with hammering out a comprehensive policy in this field, which would be designed to make possible the execution of continuous aid programmes for a varying selection of agricultural products". In this way the Commission hopes to be able to "meet the needs of LDCs adequately both in quantity and quality" better than in the past.
Resolution of the World Food Conference
The World Food Conference of November 1974, too, has adopted a resolution about an "improved policy of food aid", which makes it clear that "(food aid) should be granted in a reasonable degree of continuity in terms of quantity". The resolution counsels all the potential donor countries to adopt the "conception of advance planning for food aid", and to strain all their energies in order to keep ready food and financial funds to make available, from 1975 onwards, annual aid volumes of, at least, 10 mn tons of food grains. For the same purpose that resolution demands that "adequate quantities of other foods" should be provided for. This means that the World Food Conference has adopted the concept of supply management for food aid. The EC-Commission played a major part in the enunciation of the mentioned resolution. Already during the FAO conference in November 1973, P. Lardinois, the member of the EC-Commission in charge of agricultural issues, advocated a fundamentally new approach to food aid. On that occasion he laid down that, in his view "Food aid cannot and should not be the more or less arbitrary result of surpluses created by accident in the developed countries". According to him, food for the purpose of aid must be produced systematically.
In March 1974, the Council of Ministers of the EC received official notice of Lardinois' new concept through a "communication" and a memorandum 2 In essence this concept has been summarized in the "communication" (under Points 17 and 18): "....17. The Community's Policy of Food Aid: If the Community desires to meet its responsibilities, it must be able to adopt, at least for the coming five or ten years, an adequate policy of food aid. Keeping in mind the FAO's forecasts, the Community can hardly refuse to mobilize funds for building up a generous and consistent policy of food aid, the more so since European farmers are capable of supplying produce which, for a number of years, could contribute to meeting the need for food of the developing countries in many fields.
18. The Community is capable of practising a generous policy of food aid, which [] should safeguard a certain degree of continuity in food aid by drawing up a three-year pro-EC gramme of guide lines which would have to be based on annual commitments to deliver fixed quantities;
[] ought to cover a wide variety of different products, to be selected reflecting both the food needs of the developing countries and the normal supplies on the Community's market;
[] ought to induce an increase of aid deliveries made so far."
Aid in Kind or in Cash?
Even if one shares the opinion that food aid has to continue for many years as an important form of bridging assistance, one may harbour grave doubts in the concept of deliberate production of surpluses ("supply management"), which would more or less fade away in the case of food aid based on unplanned surpluses. In this context, a crucial question will arise: whether it would not be wiser, from the point of view of development policy, to put the funds needed for the procurement of food at the direct disposal of the LDCs instead of using them in the developed countries to finance the production and transport of deliberate surpluses. The transfer of monetary funds could be tied to the obligation that they must be used (under supervision) for buying the food from those producers, who are the cheapest ones with reference to freight expenses. LDCs themselves may well be candidates for such a selection. Dominant considerations would have to be:
Change of Cost Calculation
While structural agricultural surpluses -which, by definition, are unplanned -have to be valued, from the overall economic point of view below their market prices, frequently even considerably below their production costs, deliberately created surpluses cannot be treated in this way. From the point of view of rational use of world resources, they claim a value that is at least equal to the convertible cash value used for their production. In the interest of recipient countries, to whose advantage the entire effort will have to be mounted, it would seem much more expedient to "monetarize" food aid to a decisive extent. Instead of channelling aid via the detour, as it were, through the agricultural sector of donor countries, LDCs would enjoy its benefits directly.
It is true that there are some signs that the advocates of deliberate surplus production fundamentally wish to kill two birds by one shot: to provide food aid to LDCs by opening a new "market" for the farmers of their own countries. While talking of food aid, they also mean to give additional aid to their own agricultural sector. The concept does not become, through this, less prone to criticism.
Dual Effect of "Monetarized" Food Aid
As far as insufficient food production in certain countries is due to a lack of purchasing power, the employment of financial funds for buying food would provide a stimulus to agricultural production. No other single measure of help from the outside could be more effective in such cases than the utilization of hard cash for buying food in certain LDCs, which is given as aid to other LDCs. To weld this type of food aid with the provision of a stimulus to higher food production in other LDCs would have the highly desirable dual effect to provide needed aid to a starving LDC population but also to the food-growing LDC: directly through foreign currency earnings, indirectly through the catalyst and multiplier effects on its own agricultural sector, e.g. structural improvements, marketing, etc.
There might be cases in which the country that needs food aid is the same as that which produces foodstuffs. The "injection" of purchasing This book presents the most essential contributions to an International Symposium of the BIFOA -Betriebswirtschaftliches Institut f~ir Organisation und Automation an der Universit~t zu K~in -held in August 1973, at which more than sixty internationally recognized scientists, among them Professors Emery (USA), Galbraith (USA), Grochla (BRD), Hadberg (S), and Whisler (USA), presented their papers. The main topics concerned the development of information systems and their interrelationship to organizational structure. The discussion centered around the following areas: formal analysis and diagnosis of information systems -interdependence between the selection of organization conceptions and the structure of information systems -models and software for the construction, analysis and supervision of large information systems.
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